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THE "MARGIN OF APPRECIATION" AND





In its recent decision in Lautsi v. Italy, the Grand Chamber
of the European Court of Human Rights recognized that Italy
enjoys a wide "margin of appreciation" in questions relating to
public displays of religious symbols.' While this recognition
appears in line with the European court's case law, it was a
radical departure from the approach taken by the Chamber in its
2009 judgment in the Lautsi case and has attracted extensive
criticism. It appears worthwhile, therefore, to review the Grand
Chamber's recognition of the "margin of appreciation" in Lautsi
and, in particular, to scrutinize the Grand Chamber's legal
analysis. After briefly elaborating on the "margin of
appreciation" concept in the system of the European Convention
on Human Rights, this Article argues that the international rules
on treaty interpretation and the principle of subsidiarity provide
the Grand Chamber's use of the concept with a solid legal basis.
The relevance of both standards can hardly be questioned: Rules
on treaty interpretation are at the root of the task of the
European Court when it is called upon "[tlo ensure the
observance of the engagements undertaken by the High
t Professor of International Law, LUMSA University, Rome. The Article is an
updated version (December 31, 2012) of the paper presented at the international
conference on "State-Sponsored Religious Displays in the US and Europe," co-
organized by Lumsa and St. John's University and held on June 22, 2012, in Rome.
I See No. 30814/06, 70 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2011) [hereinafter Lautsi Il],
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040.
Lautsi was decided by a Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights on
November 3, 2009, see id. 1 30, and then by the Grand Chamber of the same court in
its judgment on March 18, 2011, which reversed the lower court's decision, see id. at
31.
49
JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 52:49
Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols
thereto,"2 and subsidiarity is one of the basic features of the
European Convention on Human Rights.
II. THE "DOCTRINE" OF THE "MARGIN OF APPRECIATION"
Usually referred to as a "doctrine," the "margin of
appreciation" refers to an area of state discretion recognized by
the European Court of Human Rights ("European Court") in the
implementation of certain rules of the European Convention on
Human Rights ("European Convention").' The margin applies, in
varying degrees, with respect to the European Convention's rules
on non-absolute rights and freedoms and with respect to the
derogation clause in Article 15.' These rules have two main
2 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 19, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Convention on Human
Rights], available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ConventionENG.pdf.
3 See YUTAKA ARAi-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR 1-2
(2002); R. St. J. MacDonald, The Margin of Appreciation in the Jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights, in 1 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF
EUROPEAN LAW 95, 103 (1992); see also GEORGE LETSAS, A THEORY OF
INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 58 (2007);
Rosario Sapienza, Sul margine d'apprezzamento statale nel sistema della
Convenzione europea dei diritti dell'uomo [On the Margin ofAppreciation in the State
System of the European Convention on Human Rights], 74 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO
INTERNAZIONALE 571, 571 (1991) (It.); Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation,
Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 843, 843 (1999);
Steven Greer, The Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights:
Universal Principle or Margin of Appreciation?, 3 UCL HUM. RTS. REV. 1, 2 (2010),
available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/human-rights/ucl-hrr/docs/hrreviewissue3/greer.
' According to the first paragraph of Article 15:
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation
any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its
obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, at art. 15. Paragraphs two and three
further limit the right to derogate from the Convention, by establishing that the
right to life-except for deaths resulting from lawful acts of war-under Article 2;
the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under
Article 3; the prohibition of slavery or servitude under Article 4, Paragraph 1; and
the nulla poena sine lege-no penalty without law-principle under Article 7 are not
derogable under any circumstance, and that states availing themselves of the right
to derogate have to inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of the
measures taken, their reasons, and their cessation. See Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 2, at art. 15; see also The System of Restrictions, in PIETER VAN
DIJK ET AL., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
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common elements. First, they are said to be "open-ended or
unsettled ... providling] limited conduct-guidance"' and allowing
a plurality of modes of implementation, all possibly compatible
with the European Convention. Second, they permit restrictions
under specified conditions that depend on the determination of
national authorities, such as the existence of a public emergency
threatening the life of the nation, or a legitimate public policy
reason, including the protection of the rights of others, public
health, or public order. For example, in one of its most recent
statements on this topic, concerning the right to vote, the Grand
Chamber said: "[T]he rights enshrined in Article 3 of Protocol
No. 1 are not absolute. There is room for implied limitations and
the Contracting States must be afforded a margin of appreciation
in this sphere."6
Many rights and freedoms protected by the European
Convention implicate important social and economic policies of
member states, and the European Convention's institutions in
Strasbourg have consistently recognized the "margin of
appreciation" of contracting parties with respect to such policies.
This recognition is so for a few reasons. First, national
democratic authorities, who are closer to local conditions, are
better positioned than international judges to devise public policy
in these fields.' Second, because local conditions differ from one
Contracting State to another, a contextual approach is needed:
"The scope of the margin of appreciation will vary according to
RIGHTS 333, 333-50 (Pieter van Dijk et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006) (discussing limitation
clauses under the European Convention).
6 Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation in International
Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907, 910 (2006); Rosario Sapienza, L'interpretazione della
Convenzione europea tra margine di apprezzamento statale e vincolo di
interpretazione conforme. Profili sistematici, in LA CONVENZIONE EUROPEA DEI
DIRITTI DELL'UOMO E IL GIUDICE ITALIANO 171 (Francesco Salerno & Rosario
Sapienza eds., 2011).
6 Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), No. 126/05, 1 83 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 22, 2012),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-111044. As
one commentator aptly observes, in such cases "[flor the Court to substitute its own
conception of what is appropriate may, therefore, result in it taking sides in national
debates concerning the resolution of genuine human rights and public interest
dilemmas which are not amenable to any straightforward legal solution." Greer,
supra note 3, at 3-4.
' ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 3, at 214 (providing references to relevant case
law).
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the circumstances, the subject-matter and its background."'
Third, historical and cultural variations must be taken into
account. Recently, for example, the Grand Chamber said, "There
are numerous ways of organising and running electoral systems
and a wealth of differences, inter alia, in historical development,
cultural diversity and political thought within Europe which it is
for each Contracting State to mould into its own democratic
vision."'
With regard to the freedom of religion and its intersection
with the right to education-the issues in Lautsi-the European
court's recognition of the "margin of appreciation" has taken on a
rather coherent pattern, revolving around some basic ideas:
Religion and education are delicate and complex areas of state
authority, where there is no common European approach; states
enjoy a margin of appreciation with respect to education policy
and their relations with religion;" it is for national authorities to
organize, regulate, and restrict the rights and freedoms involved
according to their views as they have historically developed; 12
and review of Contracting States' actions must take into account
specific local conditions.'"
Nevertheless, the discretion conferred on Contracting States
is not unlimited. The court has emphasized that Contracting
States are not relieved of their obligations under the European
Convention, and that European supervision is necessary to
establish whether Contracting States have overstepped their
legitimate discretion.'4 Proportionality also plays a role in such
assessments: The court must be satisfied that the discretion
exercised by the Contracting State does not restrict protected
rights beyond what is strictly necessary in the special
' Rasmussen v. Denmark, No. 8777/79, 1 40 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 28, 1984),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57563.
I Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), No. 74025/01, 61 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 6,
2005), available at http//hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
70442.
1o See Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06, 68, at 27-28 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2011),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040.
n Id. 1 68-69.
12 See Dogru v. France, No. 27058/05, 72, 19-20 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 4, 2008),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90039.
13 Lautsi II, No. 30814/06, 1 61, 68, 69.
14 Id. 68.
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circumstances contemplated by the limitation clauses, or amount
to undue interference with the rights guaranteed by the
European Convention."
The "margin of appreciation" doctrine has been controversial.
Critics have argued that the doctrine represents the European
court's attempt to show respect for Contracting States'
sovereignty to maintain their consent. In other words, the
doctrine represents an objectionable deference by the court to
national authorities. Similarly, critics argue, the doctrine is
hardly compatible with human rights and the underlying
aspiration to a universal standard for their protection, since it
allows for preferential treatment of the state and majorities to
the detriment of the protection of the individual and minorities.1 6
Conversely, according to more favorable opinions, the "margin of
appreciation" is "an essential constitutional device designed to
preserve the fundamental prerequisite and virtue of a liberal
democratic society: value pluralism"; and also a necessary tool for
the accommodation of individual rights and collective goals."
Supporters emphasize, however, the necessity of a principled
approach to the "margin of appreciation."
As will be argued below, this second view appears more
convincing. The "margin of appreciation" is inherent in
international human rights obligations and in their enforcement
in two respects: under the rules on treaty interpretation and due
to the subsidiary character of international human rights law
and its enforcement mechanisms.
" See ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 3, at 14, 190; see also id. at 99 (discussing
specifically freedom of religion). The Grand Chamber does not refer explicitly to
proportionality in the Lautsi case because it does not approach the display of the
crucifix in the classroom as a restriction on protected rights. See Lautsi II, No.
30814/06, at 31. However, in his concurring opinion, Judge Rozakis states that the
main issue in this case is the following:
Proportionality between, on the one hand, the right of parents to ensure
their children's education and teaching in conformity with their own
religious and philosophical convictions, and, on the other hand, the right or
interest of at least a very large segment of society to display religious
symbols as a manifestation of religion or belief.
Id. at 34. The concurring opinion of Judge Bonello also addresses proportionality. Id.
at 42.
16 See Benvenisti, supra note 3, at 844, 849 (providing additional references to
the incompatibility of the "margin of appreciation" with universal human rights).
17 ARAl-TAKAHASHI, supra note 3, at 249.
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III. THE "MARGIN OF APPRECIATION" IN LAUTSI V. ITALY
In Lautsi v. Italy, the "margin of appreciation" doctrine was
totally neglected by the Chamber, which unanimously found a
violation by Italy of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, in conjunction
with Article 9.18 The doctrine figured prominently, however, in
the Grand Chamber's decision, overturning the Chamber's ruling
by a vote of fifteen to two.' 9
In its November 3, 2009, judgment, the Chamber concluded
that by requiring the display of the crucifix in public school
classrooms, Italy had violated "the right of parents to educate
their children in conformity with their convictions and the right
of schoolchildren to believe or not believe." 20  Display of the
crucifix, the Chamber reasoned, is incompatible with the state's
duty of neutrality with respect to the exercise of its functions,
particularly education. To quote the Chamber:
[Tihe compulsory display of a symbol of a particular faith in the
exercise of public authority in relation to specific situations
subject to governmental supervision, particularly in classrooms,
restricts the right of parents to educate their children in
conformity with their convictions and the right of schoolchildren
to believe or not believe . . .. [T]he restrictions are incompatible
with the State's duty to respect neutrality in the exercise of
public authority, particularly in the field of education.21
" Lautsi II, No. 30814/06, 4.
19 Id. at 31.
20 Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06, 57 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 13 Nov. 3, 2009) [hereinafter
Lautsi 1], available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
95589, rev'd, Lautsi II, No. 30814/06.
21 Id. For a critical analysis and further sources, see generally Monica Lugato,
Simboli Religiosi E Corte Europea Dei Diritti Dell'uomo: II Caso Del Crocifisso
[Religious Symbols and the European Court of Human Rights: The Case of the
Crucifix], 93 RIVISTA Di DIRITTo INTERNAZIONALE 402 (2010); Antonino Spadaro, La
sentenza <Lautsi> sul Crocefisso: summum jus, summa iniuria? [The <Lautsi>
Judgment on the Crucifix: summum jus, summa iniuria?], DIRITTO PUBBLICO
COMPARATO ED EUROPEO (2011); J.H.H. Weiler, Editorial, Lautsi- Crucifix in the
Classroom Redux, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1-6 (2010) (author subsequently plead at the
Oral Hearing in front of the Grand Chamber on behalf of the states that intervened
in favor of Italy on appeal). For a positive appraisal of the Grand Chamber's
decision, see, for example, Susanna Mancini, The Crucifix Rage: Supranational
Constitutionalism Bumps Against the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 6 EUR.
CONST. L. REV. 6, 6 (2010). For an in-depth discussion of the case and its wider law
and religion implications, see generally CARLO CARDIA, IDENTITA RELIGIOSA E
CULTURALE EUROPA: LA QUESTIONE DEL CROCIFISSO [RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL
IDENTITY OF EUROPE: THE QUESTION OF THE CRUCIFIX] (2010).
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It is worth noting that the Chamber refers to the display of
the crucifix as a restriction of the individual rights to freedom of
religion and education in conformity with the parents'
convictions. Under the European court's case law, described
above, this reference to "restriction" should have triggered an
inquiry into conditions that might justify the restriction. Was
display of the crucifix "prescribed by law," and "necessary in a
democratic society" in the interest of public safety, the protection
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights of others?2 2 This inquiry is altogether lacking in the
Chamber's ruling. Furthermore, in accordance with Strasbourg
case law, the Chamber should have examined whether, in
"restricting" individual rights, Italy had stayed within its
"margin of appreciation," included under proportionality.2 3 As we
have seen, this is a standard feature in cases concerning freedom
of religion and the right to education. No mention was made,
however, of the "margin of appreciation," despite the fact that
Italy had invoked the doctrine before the Chamber. Italy had
argued that in the absence of a European consensus on the
notion of state secularity, or laicitg, contracting parties had a
wider "margin of appreciation" with respect to the implications
and practical consequences of that principle.24
As is well known, in its decision on March 18, 2011, the
Grand Chamber held that no violations of Article 2 of Protocol
No. 1, read in conjunction with either Article 9 or Article 14, had
occurred as a consequence of the display of the crucifix in Italian
state school classrooms. As far as the "margin of appreciation"
goes, the Grand Chamber's position can be summarized as
follows: First, contracting parties enjoy a "margin of
appreciation" in the implementation of the obligation posed by
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, since its content can vary according to
circumstances. Based upon settled case law, Article 2 cannot be
interpreted as implying a duty for the state to provide the
particular form of teaching desired by the parents.2 5 Second,
22 ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 3, at 9, 11, 62-63; Paul Mahoney, Marvellous
Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?, 19 HUM. RTs. L.J. 1, 2
(1998).
23 See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also Sahin v. Turkey, No.
44774/98, 1 71 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 10, 2005), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-70956.
24 Lautsi I, No. 30814/06, 41.
25 Lautsi II, No. 30814/06, 61.
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contracting parties enjoy a "margin of appreciation" when it
comes to setting up public school curricula, specifically with
regards to religion's place in school, where policies may
legitimately vary: The state is not prevented from providing
courses on religion that all pupils must attend, as long as the
material is imparted in an objective and critical manner and
keeps away from proselytism and indoctrination." Third, the
"margin of appreciation" extends, in principle, to the organization
of the school environment: Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 requires
respect for the right to education in conformity with parents'
convictions in the exercise of all the functions of the State in the
field of education." Fourth, the court "takes the view that the
decision whether or not to perpetuate a tradition falls in principle
within the margin of appreciation" of the Contracting States.
And finally, the court concludes that it is for the state to reconcile
the exercise of its functions in relation to education with the
exercise of its obligation to respect the rights of parents. 9
Having thus recognized Italy's "margin of appreciation," the
Grand Chamber stressed, however, that this did not relieve
Contracting States of their obligations under the European
Convention. In the context of this case, Italy had the obligation
to ensure that public schools conveyed knowledge in an
impartial, critical, and objective way, and to abstain from
proselytism and indoctrination. 0  Furthermore, the court
emphasized that Italy's action under the "margin of appreciation"
remained subject to European supervision."'
26 Id. 62. If the case allows, and given respect for the mentioned conditions,
the Contracting State can even grant larger consideration to the religion of the
majority. See, e.g., Folger0 v. Norway, No. 15472/02, 89, at 36-37 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
June 29, 2007), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=
001-81356; Appel-Irrgang v. Germany, No. 45216/07, 10-12 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 6,
2009), available at http//hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
112539 (pronouncing the compatibility with Article 2, Protocol 1, of the decision to
establish a general Ethics course for all pupils, the course having been found
"neutral" towards religion and the corresponding decision covered under the "margin
of appreciation"); Zengin v. Turkey, No. 1448/04, T 63, 17-18 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 1,
2008), available at http//hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
82580.
27 Lautsi II, No. 30814/06, %% 63-65, at 26-27.
21 Id. 68, at 27-28.
29 Id. 69.
3o Id. 64, %% 69-76, at 28-30.
3' Id. 70.
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Therefore, according to the Grand Chamber, the obligation of
the Contracting State to respect parents' convictions in the
exercise of its functions in education requires the state to abstain
from proselytism and indoctrination, while ensuring the
objective, impartial, critical, and pluralistic conveyance of
information and knowledge. Moreover, the obligation to grant
religious freedom imposes on a Contracting State the duty to
ensure that all persons under its jurisdiction enjoy the right to
have or not have, to change, and to manifest religious beliefs, and
the duty to abstain from requiring acts of observance of any given
religion. Essentially, the Contracting States must ensure
"neutrally and impartially, the exercise of various religions,
faiths and beliefs. Their role is to help maintain public order,
religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society,
particularly between opposing groups.""
According to the Grand Chamber, therefore, the duty not to
display religious symbols does not appear to be within the scope
of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 or Article 9. In context, the display
of the crucifix does not amount to indoctrination; it does not
coerce any behavior." Giving "preponderant visibility" to a
particular religion in school curricula or in the school
environment is not, in itself, incompatible with the European
Convention, nor does it violate the state's duty of neutrality.
Both conclusions are rooted in the Grand Chamber's rather
comprehensive evaluation of the context-the Italian one-in
which the display of the crucifix occurs: a context of openness to
all religions-as demonstrated in curricula, through regulations
allowing pupils to wear religious symbols or apparel, and in the
recognition of different religious practices for schools' educative,
organizational, and administrative purposes-where no tendency
to proselytize has been demonstrated, and where the right of
parents to educate their children according to their religious or
philosophical convictions appears unrestricted.
32 Id. 60.
- In this case, the court addressed the display of the crucifix as "passive." Id.
72. But see, Buscarini v. San Marino, No. 24645/94, 1 32-41, at 8-10 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Feb. 18, 1999), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-58915 (holding that the safeguard of a tradition does not justify
the obligation to make an oath on the Bible before taking office in Parliament).
34 Lautsi II, No. 30814/06, 71, at 28-29.
3 On the relevance of social history, providing at least some context within
which the various clashing values of neutrality and respect can be mediated in
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IV. EVALUATION
A. Margin ofAppreciation and the Rules on Treaty
Interpretation
Is the interpretive approach adopted by the Grand Chamber,
according to which Contracting States have discretion concerning
displays of religious symbols and in which Italy did not overstep
the limits of its "margin of appreciation" in its display of the
crucifix in state schools, legally sound?
Before answering that question, it is worth emphasizing that
the Grand Chamber was not called upon to decide whether
display of the crucifix is in itself good, bad, appropriate, or even
whether the display was in harmony "with the principle of
secularism as enshrined in Italian law,"3 ' but rather only
whether Italy had violated Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article
9 of the European Convention by requiring display of the crucifix
in state school classrooms. In fact, in its case law, the court has
reiterated that it is not for the court to express a view on the
appropriateness of the methods chosen by the legislature of a
respondent state to regulate a given field. The court's "task is
confined to determining whether the methods adopted and the
effects they entail are in conformity with the Convention."" As a
supervisory body, the court's function is to monitor observance of
the obligations that the European Convention stipulates, not to
create new ones.
freedom of religion cases, and on its role in the Lautsi case, see generally the
convincing arguments of MARc 0. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM (2013).
36 Lautsi II, No. 30814/06, 57.
37 Id. As previously noted, this is the starting point for a correct understanding
of the judgment, whereas many of its critics seem to depart from the idea that it was
for the court to enforce a specific idea of freedom of religion, understood as strict
secularism, which would not admit the public display of religious symbols, but which
is not endorsed as such by the European Convention. See Mark L. Movsesian,
Crosses and Culture: State-Sponsored Religious Displays in the US and Europe, 1
OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 338, 361 (2012). Contra Mancini, supra note 21; Lorenzo
Zucca, Lautsi A Commentary of the Grand Chamber Decision, 11 INT'L J. CONST. L.
218, 221-22 (2013).
" See, e.g., Sahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/98, [ 94 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 10, 2005),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-70956.
3 See Lautsi II, No. 30814/06, at 36 (Rozakis, J., concurring).
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The court's approach has to be evaluated under the
international rules concerning treaty interpretation. These rules
are codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties ("1969 Vienna Convention") and correspond to general
international law, as the International Court of Justice has
repeatedly recognized.40 It is settled case law of the Strasbourg
judges that the rules are applicable to the interpretation of the
European Convention, "subject, where appropriate, to 'any
relevant rules of the organization'-the Council of Europe-
within which it has been adopted (Article 5 of the Vienna
Convention).""
Article 31, Paragraph 1, of the 1969 Vienna Convention
establishes that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose," except when it is established that the parties intended
a special meaning to be given to a term used in the treaty.42
According to the same provision, on the one hand, the context
shall comprise, in addition to preamble and annexes, any
agreement or instrument concluded "in connection with the
40 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-33, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
conventions/1_1 1969.pdf; Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 431, 445-46 (2004)
("Numerous domestic, foreign, and international tribunals have recognized that the
Vienna Convention codifies customary international treaty law. The ICJ invokes the
Vienna Convention routinely, citing even some of its most controversial provisions as
customary law and applying these principles to signatories and non-signatories
alike.").
41 See Golder v. United Kingdom, No. 4451/70, 29 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 21,
1975), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
57496. For a critical view, see Giorgio Gaja, Does the European Court of Human
Rights Use Its Stated Methods of Interpretation?, in DIVENIRE SOCIALE E
ADEGUAMENTO DEL DIRITTO, STUDI IN ONORE DI FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI 213 (1999);
see also Letsas, supra note 3, at 58; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Evolutionary Interpretation
of Treaties: Between Memory and Prophecy, in THE LAW OF TREATIES BEYOND THE
VIENNA CONVENTION 123, 133 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2011).
42 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 40, at art. 31. Among
the most recent contributions, see generally Mark E. Villiger, The Rules on
Interpretation: Misgivings, Misunderstandings, Miscarriage? The "Crucible"
Intended by the International Law Commission, in THE LAW OF TREATIES BEYOND
THE VIENNA CONVENTION 105 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2011).
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conclusion of the treaty" and accepted by all the parties; on the
other hand, account shall be taken, together with said context, of
any
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its
provisions; . . . any subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
its interpretation; . . . [and] any relevant rules of international
law applicable in the relations between the parties.43
At first the Grand Chamber looked at the ordinary meaning
of the terms employed in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, and in
Article 9 of the European Convention. It found that "respect" for
parents' religious and philosophical convictions and "freedom
of ... religion" did not include the prohibition to display religious
symbols in their ordinary meaning.4 The Strasbourg Court has
consistently interpreted Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in conjunction
with Article 9 of the European Convention to prohibit
proselytism and indoctrination by the state, and to require an
impartial, objective, and pluralistic approach to all the functions
the state exercises with respect to education. The court has not
judged the greater visibility of a particular religion as contrary to
the European Convention. 45 And finally, in this respect, the case
law has also underlined two other important aspects: First, "the
meaning or impact of the public expression of a religious belief
4 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 40, at art. 31. The
"[gleneral rule of interpretation" in Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention is
complemented by a rule concerning the "[s]upplementary means of interpretation"-
Article 32-and by a rule on treaties authenticated in two or more languages-
Article 33. Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties, supra note 40, at art. 31-33.
4 See Lautsi II, No. 30814/06, [% 59-62, 66, 70, 72, 76, 77 (finding that the state
in keeping crucifixes in school classrooms acted within the limits of the margin of
appreciation and did not violate Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 9 of the
Convention).
45 See Folger0 v. Norway, No. 15472/02, [ 84, 34-35 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 29,
2007), available at http:H/hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
81356; see also id. 1 89, at 37 (holding that the fact that Christianity represented a
greater part of the curriculum than other religions and philosophies did not
constitute a departure from pluralism and objectivity); Zengin v. Turkey, No.
1448/04, [[ 51, 53 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 1, 2008), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-82580 (finding that
Article 2 "does not prevent the States from disseminating in State schools, by means
of the teaching given, objective information or knowledge of a directly or indirectly
religious or philosophical kind").
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will differ according to time and context";4 6 and second, in these
matters rules may vary according to national traditions, and
corresponding choices must be left to the state concerned. 47
These statements stem directly from the object and purpose of
the European Convention-a main element in treaty
interpretation-and suggest that a plurality of approaches is not
prohibited by the text of the European Convention. In other
words, "the maintenance and further realisation of human rights
and fundamental freedoms" in Europe through the establishment
and development of a "common understanding and observance" of
human rights48 does not require the erasing of national
dimensions of human rights protection, nor of national
approaches to human rights, to the extent that they are
compatible with the common standards, as seems to be the case
in the area of the display of religious symbols, which is not yet
the object of a common standard at all.
As a second step, the Grand Chamber determined that a
common understanding concerning religious displays in state
schools did not emerge from the law and practice of the
Contracting States. It examined the legislation of the members
of the Council of Europe and found that the great majority of
states did not regulate the presence of religious symbols in state
schools. Such displays were expressly forbidden in three states,
yet expressly prescribed in another three, in addition to Italy, as
well as in certain regions of two other states." The Grand
Chamber also examined the case law of member states' supreme
courts concerning the legality of state-sponsored displays of
religious symbols in state schools, and found, again, that the
cases differed depending not only on the specific features of each
case, but also on a varying understanding of the concept of state
neutrality.50 The Grand Chamber concludes, as is well known,
that "there is no European consensus on the question of the
presence of religious symbols in State schools," and that this
46 Sahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/98, 109 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 10, 2005), available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-70956.
4 Id.
48 Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, at preamble (emphasis added).
' Lautsi II, No. 30814/06, % 27.
50 Id. 1 26-28, at 12-13. The point concerning European diversity, and its
value, was forcefully made by J.H.H. Weiler, in his oral submission to the Grand
Chamber. See J.H.H. Weiler, Editorial, State and Nation; Church, Mosque and
Synagogue-the Trailer, 8 INT'L J. CONST. L. 157, 162-63 (2010).
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circumstance "speaks in favour" of recognizing that the matter
falls within the "margin of appreciation" of the Contracting
State." In other words, the different models followed in the
legislations of the Contracting States, and the different solutions
given in their case law, suggest that there is no common
approach in Europe to the display of religious symbols in state
schools, nor to the exercise of state functions in education,
particularly concerning the obligation to respect parents'
religious and philosophical convictions; nor does such consensus
exist in the concept of state neutrality towards religion. This
assessment implies that the obligation not to display religious
symbols in state schools is neither within the meaning of freedom
of religion under Article 9, nor within respect for parents'
convictions in education under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.52
The Grand Chamber's search for the existence of a European
consensus, to ascertain whether the obligation to not display
religious symbols is established by the European Convention, has
attracted a great deal of criticism." I would argue, however, that
such criticism fails to see that the relevance of a "European
consensus" can be traced back to the rules on treaty
interpretation-more specifically, to the concept of subsequent
practice mentioned in Article 31, Paragraph 3(b), of the 1969
Vienna Convention, as one of the elements an interpreter must
consider in the process of ascertaining the "ordinary
meaning ... [ofJ the terms" used in a treaty.54
" Lautsi II, No. 30814106, 70 (emphasis added).
52 This reasoning is criticized in Judge Malinverni's dissent, joined by Judge
Kalaydjieva. Because the presence of religious symbols in state schools is expressly
regulated only in a few Contracting States, and not specifically regulated in most of
the others, "definite conclusions regarding a European consensus" are difficult to
draw. See id. at 47 (Malinverni, J., dissenting). But the fact that in the majority of
countries this question is not expressly regulated is evidence of lack of a European
consensus on their presence. In such a situation-and given the divergences in the
case law on the matter-it would be arbitrary to affirm that the presence of religious
symbols in state schools is either admitted, or on the contrary, banned in Europe. It
is neither, and, therefore, no elements to interpret such state-sponsored displays as
incompatible with freedom of religion or with the obligation to respect parents'
convictions derive from the practice of Contracting States.
61 See Mancini, supra note 21, at 25-26 (stating that relying on consensus
allows the European Court to avoid taking responsibility for its actions); Zucca,
supra note 37, at 226 (criticizing the court's position that respect is a matter of
consensus); see also Lautsi II, No. 30814/06, at 47 (Malinverni, J., dissenting).
5 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 40, at art. 31.
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Conceived for "the maintenance and further realisation of
human rights and fundamental freedoms,"55 the European
Convention is a "living instrument" whose meaning evolves over
time and whose evolution has to be taken into account to fully
appreciate the obligations that it expresses at any given
moment. 6 From this point of view, subsequent shared practice in
the application of the agreement-that is, a practice establishing
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation-is
precisely the engine through which new common standards that
have not found explicit expression in the text, including the
additional protocols, might develop. This is particularly true in
those areas of the European Convention where the rules are
rather open ended, as in the context of education and freedom of
religion. In fact, one would expect such rules to undergo
progressive development and refining as historical, political, and
social conditions change, and as the understanding of human
rights protection evolves, revealing legal meanings that were
originally hidden in the propositions of the European Convention.
From the point of view of the rules on the interpretation of
treaties, then, the lack of a common practice concerning state
displays of religious symbols means that an obligation for.
Contracting States not to allow such displays in state schools
cannot be considered as having subsequently developed from the
European Convention's text-notably from Articles 9 of the
5 Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, at pmbl. (emphasis added).
' Sahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/08, 136 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 10, 2005), available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-70956; Tyrer v. United
Kingdom, No. 5856/72, 31 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 25, 1978), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57587. The literature
that has dealt with this aspect of the ECHR, and of human rights treaties in
general, is vast. See FRANCOISE TULKENS, DIALOGUE BETWEEN JUDGES: "WHAT ARE
THE LIMITS TO THE EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONVENTION?" 7-8 (2011),
available at http://echr.coe.int/Documents/Dialogue_2011_ENG.pdf (discussing the
limits to interpreting the Convention with respect to adapting it to changes that
have taken place over time); Dupuy, supra note 41, at 133-34 (emphasizing,
correctly, that based on the wording of the preamble of the ECHR, "evolutionary"
interpretation appears in harmony with its text and is required by its double
dynamic: the dynamic of human rights norms, national and international,
intrinsically evolutionary in nature, and the dynamic of "ethical concepts embedded
in the social fabric of the different member states which produce a number of
practices"); Georg Nolte, Between Contemporaneous and Evolutive Interpretation:
The Use of "Subsequent Practice" in the Judgment of the International Court of
Justice Concerning the Case of Costa Rica v. Nicaragua (2009), in 2 COEXISTENCE,
COOPERATION AND SOLIDARITY: LIBER AMICORUM RODIGER WOLFRUM 1675, 1675-
84 (Holger P. Hestermeyer et al. eds., 2012).
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European Convention and 2 of Protocol No. 1-read in the light
of the context defined in Article 31, Paragraphs 2 and 3, of the
1969 Vienna Convention. In this perspective, the often criticized
reference by the European court, as part of its assessment of the
"margin of appreciation," to the lack of a European consensus as
a reason to consider the subject matter within Contracting
States' discretion, appears to be legally sound: It serves to find
that the obligation cannot be considered as having been
subsequently developed from the European Convention's text,
and is not therefore, part of the common standard that
Contracting States are bound to implement. Thus, it is not an
unnecessary or extravagant reference, but one that is dictated by
the general rules on treaty interpretation, which stipulate that
the object and purpose of a treaty and the common practice of the
contracting parties in its application are among the criteria to
use in ascertaining the ordinary meaning of the terms of the
treaty and the obligations imposed. This is an insufficiently
considered aspect of the "margin of appreciation" approach in the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights: Even those
authors who have defended the objective nature of the European
consensus assessment,7 have not, to my knowledge, recognized
its legal basis in the rules on treaty interpretation as being a
correct application, in the context of the European Convention, of
the "subsequent practice" provision of the 1969 Vienna
Convention. 8 However, the connection to the rules on
interpretation is crucial for at least two reasons. First, linking
the search for a "European consensus" to Article 31 of the 1969
Vienna Convention ensures that the Strasbourg Court remains
within the limits of a permissible evolutionary interpretation,59
and does not exercise sheer norm creation. The latter would be
incompatible with the European Convention's structure as an
67 See MacDonald, supra note 3; Greer, supra note 3, at 5 (stating that the
margin of appreciation is itself one of the Convention's principles of interpretation
deriving, together with the others employed by the court, from the teleological
principle stemming from Articles 31 to 33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention).
" Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 40, at art. 31.
9 In fact, where evolutionary interpretation rests on subsequent practice, it
appears in conformity with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention; and the ECHR is a
treaty that, from the point of view of its content (filled with terms that are subject to
evolution by their very nature); purposes (the further realisation of human rights
together with their maintenance); and institutional dimension (mainly represented
by the court and the Committee of Ministers), is required to be interpreted in the
light of present conditions.
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international treaty and with the role of the court as the
institution established by the Contracting States for its
interpretation.o Second, it would promote the consistent use of
the European consensus standard by the Strasbourg Court,
respectful of the conditions required by Article 31(2)(b) of the
1969 Vienna Convention, for "subsequent practice" to qualify as a
criterion of interpretation.
B. The "Margin ofAppreciation" and Subsidiarity
The "margin of appreciation" should also be evaluated in
light of the principle of subsidiarity. Due to the need for brevity
and because the connection between the "margin of appreciation"
and subsidiarity is widely recognized, I will only briefly sketch
my argument.
International human rights law establishes common
standards and creates supervisory mechanisms designed to
operate as a subsidium to national human rights law. 62  The
European court has consistently acknowledged and relied on the
subsidiary character of the European system for the protection of
human rights. In principle, the democratic state is better
positioned to interpret its community's interests where the
values of individual and collective life are concerned. Moreover,
such a state is better positioned to assess the need for
restrictions on human rights, according to the discipline of the
European Convention. Therefore, national judges are the "front-
line" judges in the enforcement of the European Convention, and
" Dupuy, supra note 41, at 135 ("[The] margin of appreciation in many cases
serves to do away with the need for the Court to provide a radical evolutionary
interpretation of certain freedoms.").
61 The inconsistencies in the application of the European consensus standard
have been analyzed in depth. See Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence and the
European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 133, 135 (1993).
62 This aspect of international human rights law is widely recognized, and, as
we will see, it is receiving renewed attention both in the literature and within
human rights bodies. See generally Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural
Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 38 (2003). For
specific reference to the European Convention, see Herbert Petzold, The Convention
and the Principle of Subsidiarity, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 4, 41 (R. St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993); Laurence R. Helfer,
Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep
Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 125,
127-28 (2008); see also Monica Lugato, Sulla Sussidiarieta In Diritto Internazionale
[On Subsidiarity in International Law], 231 ARCHIVIO GIURIDICO FILIPPO SERAFINI
129 (2011).
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the enforcement mechanism devised by the European Convention
is itself subsidiary to the national judiciaries of the contracting
parties."
The importance of the principle of subsidiarity has been
strongly emphasized in the High Level Conferences on the
Future of the European Court of Human Rights.6 4 In the
Interlaken Declaration on February 19, 2010, which "[s]tress[ed]
the subsidiary nature of the supervisory mechanism established
by the Convention and notably the fundamental role which
national authorities, i.e. governments, courts and parliaments,
must play in guaranteeing and protecting human rights at the
national level," the Conference called for "a strengthening of the
principle of subsidiarity," which "implies a shared responsibility
between the States Parties and the Court."6 5 At the more recent
Brighton Declaration in April 2012, the High Level Conference
on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights returned
to subsidiarity and the "margin of appreciation" affirming that:
The jurisprudence of the Court makes clear that the States
Parties enjoy a margin of appreciation in how they apply and
implement the Convention, depending on the circumstances of
the case and the rights and freedoms engaged. This reflects
that the Convention system is subsidiary to the safeguarding of
human rights at national level and that national authorities are
in principle better placed than an international court to
63 See Handyside v. United Kingdom, No. 5493/72, 48-49, at 17-18 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Dec. 7, 1976), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-57499. For analysis in the area of religious freedom, see Dogru v.
France, No. 27058/05, T 63 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 4, 2008), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90039; Sahin v. Turkey,
No. 44774/98, T 109 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 10, 2005), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-70956. A great deal of
attention has been increasingly dedicated by the Strasbourg organs to the issue of
the relationship between national judges and the Court. See generally EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, DIALOGUE BETWEEN JUDGES: How CAN WE ENSURE
GREATER INVOLVEMENT OF NATIONAL COURTS IN THE CONVENTION SYSTEM? (2012),
available at http://echr.coe.int/Documents/Dialogue-2011_.ENG.pdf.
6 The future of the court, shadowed by a growing backlog of pending cases, has
been at the center of three such conferences, held in 2010 in Interlaken, 2011 in
Izmir, and 2012 in Brighton. See Reform of the European Court of Human Rights,
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://hub.coe.int/what-we-do/human-rights/reform-of-the-
european-court (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).
6 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, HIGH LEVEL CONFERENCE ON THE
FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERLAKEN DECLARATION 1-
2 (2010), available at http://www.eda.admin.ch/et/mediaib/downloads/edazen/
topics/europa/euroc.Par.0133.File.tmp/final-en.pdf.
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evaluate local needs and conditions. The margin of appreciation
goes hand in hand with supervision under the Convention
system. In this respect, the role of the Court is to review
whether decisions taken by national authorities are compatible
with the Convention, having due regard to the State's margin of
appreciation. 66
The protection of human rights is both a matter for
national-constitutional-law and international law. Therefore,
it lends itself particularly well to the application of the principle
of subsidiarity, which is an organizing principle of the allocation
of authority among the local, national, and international orders.
Subsidiarity requires that society does not pre-empt individuals
in tasks that they can perform for themselves and that the larger
community does not perform functions that smaller communities
can accomplish themselves. Both legislating-setting
standards-and enforcing human rights are for national
authorities to decide. Only where national authorities fail are
the international authorities called upon to subsidize them.
"Subsidize them" means to assist them to reach an autonomous
capacity to provide for human rights protection at the level that
has been internationally agreed. It also means to substitute for
national authorities in extreme cases, where protection is
altogether failing."
In light of this, the "margin of appreciation" is one of the
logical consequences of subsidiarity: If the state is better
positioned to set, adjudicate, and implement standards for its
national community, then the international institution should
only intervene to redress violations of internationally agreed
standards when the state shows an inability-or unwillingness-
to act. Thus, subsidiarity provides justification for the attitude of
the European court in recognizing the discretionary space of
6 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights:
Brighton Declaration, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://hub.coe.int/20120419-brighton-
declaration (last visited Sept. 23, 2013). For further analysis, see generally Laurence
R. Helfer, The Burdens and Benefits of Brighton, ESIL REFLECTIONS (June 8, 2012),
http://www.esil-sedi.eu/sites/default/files/Helfer%20Benefits%20and%20Burdens%
20of%2OBrighton%203June2012-2.pdf.
67 From this point of view, "embeddedness" as advocated by Helfer, appears to
be an expression of subsidiarity, rather than a complement to it. See Helfer, supra
note 62, at 131. In fact, when domestic remedies are unavailable, the principle of
subsidiarity requires that the international authority substitute the national remedy
and aim at bolstering domestic compliance with internationally protected human
rights. Helfer, supra note 62, at 129-30.
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Contracting States in the implementation of the European
Convention, especially in areas where they appear to have
undertaken no obligations and no obligations can be deemed to
have arisen from their common practice.
The European court's adoption of a subsidiarity approach is
required by legitimacy considerations inherent in the
subsidiarity discourse: National authorities-at least in
democratic countries-are more legitimate legislators, judges,
and administrators than international authorities. And
subsidiarity is also required as a safeguard for pluralism, which
is at the heart of the international protection of human rights.
Finally, subsidiarity offers another justification for the self-
restraint of the European court when faced with unsettled
aspects of human rights protection. For instance, in Karatas v.
Turkey, the court stated that "the democratic legitimacy of
measures taken by democratically elected governments
commands a degree of judicial self-restraint."" Commentators
argue that international courts are sub-optimal decision-makers
in comparison to national authorities because they are detached
from local communities, lack local perception of legitimacy, and
are affected by a democratic deficit."9
68 Karatas v. Turkey, No. 23168/94, at 35 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 8, 1999)
(Wildhaber, J., dissenting), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-58274; see also Handyside, No. 5493/72, 91 48; Case "Relating to
Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium" v.
Belgium, Nos. 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63, 2126/64, 91 10 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. July 23, 1968), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.
aspx?i=001-57525 (discussing certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in
education); Mahoney, supra note 22, at 3-4, 6. Even harsh critics of the "margin of
appreciation" approach agree that if effective domestic institutional and judicial
guarantees are in place, then "deference to their outcomes, through the margins
doctrine, may be called for." Benvenisti, supra note 3, at 849. For a valuable
discussion of the relevance of the institutional differences between constitutional
and international courts for decisions on religious symbols, see generally Dominic
McGoldrick, Religion in the European Public Square and in European Public Life-
Crucifixes in the Classroom?, 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 451 (2011); Movsesian, supra
note 37.
69 Shany, supra note 5, at 918; see also OLIVIER DE SCHUTIER, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, COMMENTARY 324 (2010); see generally
Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name? An Investigation of
International Courts' Public Authority and Its Democratic Justification, 23 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 7 (2012). The "priority" of national authorities over the European Cour of
Human Rights is recognized, with specific reference to Lautsi, in Zucca, supra note
37, at 228 (criticizing the Grand Chamber judgment).
68
2013] "MARGIN OFAPPRECIATION"AND RELIGION
It is doubtful that the purpose of the European Convention is
absolute uniformity in all aspects of the protection of human
rights among all forty-seven members of the Council of Europe.
In the words of one commentator, "[ls it realistic to pretend that
the whole continent will be covered by a 'common European
standard', in each and every aspect of an individual's life?"" For
the time being, it seems that a negative answer flows from the
very aims of the European Convention, as interpreted by its
court, through considerations of subsidiarity and sheer historical
facts."
In these respects, the question can be raised whether the
national acts imposing the display of crucifixes in the classrooms
of Italian state schools" can legitimately be deemed a
"democratic" expression of the Italian polity. 3 A consistent
element in the "margin of appreciation" assessment is the
democratic character of the relevant national authority and of
the local decision-making processes, having led to the contested
norms. For example, in Sahin v. Turkey, the European court
emphasized that "the decision-making process for applying the
internal regulations satisfied, so far as was possible, the
requirement to weigh up the various interests at stake."" This
specific aspect of the Italian regulations concerning the display of
the crucifix must be tackled, but the task is not for the European
court, but the national community.
70 JAN ERIK HELGESEN, DIALOGUE BETWEEN JUDGES: "WHAT ARE THE LIMITS
TO THE EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONVENTION?" 7-8 (2011) (emphasis
added), available at http://echr.coe.int/Documents/Dialogue_201 1ENG.pdf;
Sapienza, supra note 3, at 117.
71 See Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, No. 6538/74, 61, at 30-31 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Apr. 26, 1979), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.
aspx?i=001-57583.
72 Examined with reference to relevant national case law by DI PAOLO CAVANA,
LA QUESTIONE DEL CROCIFISSO IN ITALIA [THE QUESTION OF THE CRUCIFIX IN
ITALY] (2004), available at http//www.olir.it/areetematiche/75/documents/Cavana
questionedelcrocifisso.pdf.
73 See Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06, 1-2, at 48-49 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18,
2011) (Malinverni, J., dissenting), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/
pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040.
7 Sahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/98, 159 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 10, 2005), available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-70956.
75 On this aspect of the Lautsi case, see the very sharp remarks of Spadaro,
supra note 21. J.H.H. Weiler also stressed that it is up to the national community to
decide matters concerning the status of religion in the public sphere in his oral
submission to the Grand Chamber. See Weiler, supra note 50, at 163.
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CONCLUSION
It is interesting to observe that very nuanced position as to
the content of human rights obligations in the area of religious
displays has been expressed by prominent interpreters. The
Human Rights Committee in both the General Comment No. 22
on Freedom of Religion, and the Special Rapporteur on Freedom
of Religion and Belief acknowledged the complexity of the topic,
the absence of a general blueprint applicable to all constellations
or situations, and the need for a case by case approach. In this
respect, the "margin of appreciation" and subsidiarity represent
important tools to accommodate effective protection of the right
to religious freedom and the right to education with due
consideration of the place of religion in any given society. In
addition, further research into their dynamics is required for an
appropriate legal and not ideological approach to human rights
treaties.
76 General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and
Religion (Art. 18), Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/21/Rev.l/Add.4 (July 30,
1993), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/9a30112c27d1167ccl2563
ed004d8f15.
" See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief Hum.
Rts. Counsil, 41-46, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/60 (Dec. 22, 2011); see also ODIHR
ADVISORY COUNCIL, TOLEDO GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON TEACHING ABOUT RELIGIONS
AND BELIEFS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 77 (2007).
70
